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How to generate genuine quantum randomness from untrusted devices is an important problem
in quantum information processing. Inspired by the previous work on self-testing quantum random
number generator[Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 150501], we present a new method to generate quantum
randomness from a prepare-and-measure scenario with independent devices. In existing protocols,
the quantum randomness only depends on a witness value (e.g., CHSH value ), which is calculated
with the observed probabilities. Differently, here all the observed probabilities are directly used to
calculate the min-entropy in our method. Through numerical simulation, we find that the min-
entropy of our proposed scheme is higher than the previous work, when a typical untrusted BB84
setup is used. Consequently, thanks to the proposed method, more genuine quantum random
numbers may be obtained than before.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
True randomness is an essential resource in quantum information processing and has multiple applications in
numerical simulation, statistics, lottery games and cryptography. Since it is impossible to generate true random
numbers by computer algorithms, most true random number generators are based on unpredictable physical process.
Recently a variety of quantum random number generation (QRNG)schemes based on the intrinsic randomness of
quantum theory have been proposed[1–14]. All of these schemes work essentially according to the same principle,
exploiting the randomness of quantum measurements. However, the random numbers generated by these protocols
relies on the assumption of the specific internal functioning of devices. The output data can only be tested by
statistical method, such as statistical test suite from NIST[15]. The statistical method cannot guarantee the true
randomness of the output data. Furthermore, if the devices are spoiled or controlled by an adversary, the output
data may be just pseudo-random numbers. To solve this problem, “Device-Independent” (DI) QRNG was built[16],
which does not need knowledge of the internal functioning of the devices. The private randomness in DI protocols is
certified by Bell inequality violation but not the details of the quantum devices. Unfortunately, such protocols are
quite impractical under current technology, since they demand the total efficiency must be very high to avoid detection
loophole attacks. Inspired by the DI approach to true randomness, Li et al proposed the semi-device-independent
random number generation protocol[17]. Semi-device-independent approach works in a prepare-and-measure scenario
in which no assumption is made on the internal functioning of the preparation and measurement devices, except that
the dimension of the quantum system accessed by the measurement device is bounded[18]. However, this protocol
still suffers from detection loophole attacks[19].
Last year, Bowles et al proposed a new scheme based on a prepare-and-measure setup [21] and experimentally
realized it[22]. This protocol (BQB14 for abbreviation) seems like SDI protocol, but requires the assumptions that
the preparation and measurement devices are independent and the quantum system has bounded dimension. This
protocol uses a dimension witness value to characterize the quantum randomness of the system. Since the witness
value is given by an equality, this protocol can be used to generate randomness with high channel loss. Here we
present a novel QRNG protocol also in a prepare-and-measure scenario with independent devices. The assumption of
our protocol is completely the same as the BQB14. We make no assumption on the functioning of the devices except
the dimension of preparation device is set to be 2 and its hidden variables are independent of any other devices. The
key difference between our protocol and the BQB14 is that: we use all the observed probabilities instead of a witness
value as the index of the potential quantum randomness. In BQB14 and even all SDI, DI protocols, one must use the
observed probabilities to calculate a witness value, then use this witness value to calculate the quantum randomness
of the output data. Unlike the existing protocols, we search all the possible quantum preparation and measurement
process satisfied all the observed probabilities to find the minimum real randomness of the output data. The merit of
our method is that all the observed probabilities are directly used to calculate the randomness, thus our method may
be optimal than the existed protocols. Simulation results show our protocol works with very low detection efficiency.
With a typical prepare-and-measure setup (untrusted BB84 setup[20]), we find that entropy of the proposed protocol
is higher than BQB14 protocol.
II. PROTOCOL
Our protocol can be implemented with standard BB84 QKD systems as Fig 1.
Alice Bob
x {0, 1, 2, 3}∈ y {0,   1}∈
ρx
b {0,   1}∈
Data p b x y( | , )
FIG. 1. Sketch of the protocol
3The protocol is as follow:
1. Alice randomly prepares four qubit states ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3 by inputting x=0,1,2,3 to her device respectively.
2. For Bob there are two measurements y=0,1 with two outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. In general, the measurement My =
{M0y ,M
1
y} should be a POVM. However, we first assume that My is a projective measurement for simplicity.
The POVM case will be analyzed later in this paper.
3. Alice and Bob observe the conditional probabilities q(b|x, y). The task is to extract real quantum randomness
generated by potential quantum process according to all the observed probabilities q(b|x, y).
Before proceeding, we must model our device with hidden variables. To model the characteristics of the preparation
devices, we represent the internal state of the preparation device by a random variable λ. In each run of the experiment,
the preparation device emits a qubit sate ρλx which depends on the setting x and the internal hidden variable λ. Hence
when Alice inputs x, the device prepares
∑
λ q
λ
xρ
λ
x. We assume that λ is unknown to the legitimate users, and even
also any adversary. This is the key difference between our model and DI protocols. In DI ones, the hidden variable λ
is planted by an adversary and thus known to the adversary. Conversely, in our model the adversary only knows the
distribution of λ but does not know the exact value of λ of each run. Our assumption of preparation device is quite
similar to BQB14. For measurement device, since we have assumed that the adversary including the measurement
device has no idea about the exact value of λ of each run , the measurement device performs an unknown measurement
My, which is irrelevant of λ. As the observer has no access to the variable λ, he will only observe the distribution:
q(b|x, y) =
∑
λ
qλxp(b|x, y, λ)
=
∑
λ
qλxTr(ρ
λ
xM
b
y),
(1)
where
ρx =
∑
λ
qλxρ
λ
x (2)
Without loss of generality, we can rewrite ρx =
∑
λ q
λ
x
∣∣Ψλ
〉〈
Ψλ
∣∣. The task of the legitimate user is to esti-
mate the amount of genuine quantum randomness generated in the setup based only on the observed distribution
q(b|x, y). Since we have assumed that My = {M
0
y ,M
1
y} is a projective measurement, the genuine quantum ran-
domness for the output data under measurement My is given by maximum value of guess probability, which is
pg =
∑
λ q
λ
xmax{
〈
Ψλ
∣∣M0y
∣∣Ψλ
〉
,
〈
Ψλ
∣∣M1y
∣∣Ψλ
〉
}. The maximum value of the guessing probability pg reflects the gen-
uine quantum randomness. Since the hidden variable λ is unknown to user, one should calculate maxλpg by searching
all possible distribution of λ and decomposition of ρx. A general consideration for how to calculate this value is given
in the next section.
III. ANALYSIS
We still consider the measurements are all projective measurements at first. For the output data with ρx under mea-
surementMy, we define the maximum value of guessing probability asmax pg(x, y) = max
qλx
∑
λ q
λ
x max
b∈{0,1}
Tr(
∣∣Ψλx
〉〈
Ψλx
∣∣M by),
which reflects the quantum randomness. Although the hidden variable λ may have infinite values, we can be divided λ
into two parts by the value of Tr(
∣∣Ψλx
〉〈
Ψλx
∣∣M0y ) is higher than 12 or not. So it will be not restrictive for the calculation
of maxpg(x, y) if we assume λ can be just chosen from two values λ1 and λ2. The maximal guessing probability
becomes
max pg(x, y) = q
λ1
x max {Tr(
∣∣Ψλ1x
〉〈
Ψλ1x
∣∣M0y ), T r(
∣∣Ψλ1x
〉〈
Ψλ1x
∣∣M1y )}
+ qλ2x max {Tr(
∣∣Ψλ2x
〉〈
Ψλ2x
∣∣M0y ), T r(
∣∣Ψλ2x
〉〈
Ψλ2x
∣∣M1y )}
(3)
The maximal guessing probability denotes the solution to the following optimization problem:
max pg(x, y)
subject to :
{q(b|x, y) = qλ1x Tr(
∣∣Ψλ1x
〉〈
Ψλ1x
∣∣M by) + qλ2x Tr(
∣∣Ψλ2x
〉〈
Ψλ2x
∣∣M by), b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, y ∈ {0, 1}}
(4)
4TABLE I. Parameters .
y\x 0 1 2 3
0 1− e0 e1 p(0|2, 0) p(0|3, 0)
1 p(0|0, 1) p(0|1, 1) e2 1− e3
Above formulae are based on the assumption that My is a projective measurement. However, My may be a POVM
but not projective measurement. Fortunately, as proved in [23], a general POVM can be decomposed into 3 different
operations, which is performed randomly. Concretely, the three operations are performing a projective measurement
to decide the output, or just generating 0 or 1 without any measurement. Then we will use this measurement
model to estimate the quantum randomness. We can assume the probabilities to choose these three operations to be
{my, u
0
y, u
1
y}(my + u
0
y + u
1
y) for y=0 and 1 separately. As a result, the min-entropy for the output of measurement
My is given as
max pg(x, y) = myq
λ1
x max {Tr(
∣∣Ψλ1x
〉〈
Ψλ1x
∣∣M0y ), T r(
∣∣Ψλ1x
〉〈
Ψλ1x
∣∣M1y )}
+myq
λ2
x max {Tr(
∣∣Ψλ2x
〉〈
Ψλ2x
∣∣M0y ), T r(
∣∣Ψλ2x
〉〈
Ψλ2x
∣∣M1y )} + (1−my)
(5)
Consider we are interested with two-dimension system, it is convenient to rewrite our formulae with Bloch vectors.
The observed probabilities are rewritten as q(0|x, y) = my(
1
2 +
~Sx·~Ty
2 ) + u
0
y, where
~Sx is the Bloch vector of the input
state ρx, ~Ty is the Bloch vector of the projective measurement My. The problem of finding the genuine quantum
randomness becomes the calculation of
max pg(x, y) = max {myq
λ1
x (
1
2
+
1
2
|~Sλ1x ·
~Ty|) +myq
λ2
x (
1
2
+
1
2
|~Sλ2x ·
~Ty|) + (1−my)}
subject to
q(0|x, y) = my(
1
2
+
1
2
|~Sx · ~Ty|) + u
0
y
~Sx = q
λ1
x
~Sλ1x + q
λ2
x
~Sλ2x
(6)
where qλ1x + q
λ2
x = 1, ~S
λ1
x and ~S
λ2
x are Bloch vectors for qubit states. This is an optimization problem of variables
my, u
b
y, q
λ1
x , q
λ2
x ,
~Sx, ~S
λ1
x ,
~Sλ2x ,
~Ty subject to above constraints.
In an experiment, Alice and Bob observe the probabilities q(b|x, y) and then we can use numerical method to
compute max pg(x, y). In practical, we are particularly interested in extracting randomness from an untrusted BB84
setup. In next section, we simplify the general result to be fit for the experimental results based on untrusted BB84
setup.
IV. PROTOCOL IN BB84 SETUP
Now we consider how to realize our protocol with an untrusted BB84 implementation. Ideally, the input states
for x=0,1,2,3 are {|H〉, |V 〉, |+〉, |−〉} respectively, and the measurements for y=0,1 are projective measurements
{|H〉〈H |, |V 〉〈V |} and {|+〉〈+|, |−〉〈−|}. The probability distribution p(0|x, y) is shown in Table 1.
where e0, e1, e2 and e3 are quantum bit error rates(QBER).
The measurement results can be written in our measurement framework as:
p(0|0, 0) = m0(
1
2
+
1
2
|~S0 · ~T0|) + u
0
0 = 1− e0 (7)
p(0|1, 0) = m0(
1
2
+
1
2
|~S1 · ~T0|) + u
0
0 = e1 (8)
p(0|2, 0) = m0(
1
2
+
1
2
|~S2 · ~T0|) + u
0
0 (9)
p(0|3, 0) = m0(
1
2
+
1
2
|~S3 · ~T0|) + u
0
0 (10)
5p(0|2, 1) = m1(
1
2
+
1
2
|~S2 · ~T1|) + u
0
1 = 1− e2 (11)
p(0|3, 1) = m1(
1
2
+
1
2
|~S3 · ~T1|) + u
0
1 = e3 (12)
The quantum bit error rate e0, e1, e2 and e3 can be measured in the experiment and are always between 0 and 0.5.
We can find out the maximal value of mean guessing probabilities
P¯ =
1
4
max
3∑
x=0
pg(x, 0) (13)
i.e., the average guessing probability of the outcome for input states x=0,1,2,3 in the measurement y=0.
In an experiment base on untrusted BB84 setup, we may observe that p(0|2, 0) and p(0|3, 0) are close to 1/2, which
means that p(0|2, 0) and p(0|3, 0) are possibly related to the mismatched basis events. Conversely, we may suspect
that p(0|0, 0) and p(0|1, 0) are related to matched basis events. It is reasonable to extract more randomness from
mismatched basis events than matched basis events. Hence, without loss of generality, we let pg(0, 0) = pg(1, 0) = 1
all the time and try to obtain a tighter upper bound for pg(2, 0) + pg(3, 0).
As proved in the last section, to calculate pg(2, 0) + pg(3, 0) we should decompose the input state ρ2 and ρ3 into
two parts and search all over the qubit strategies to get the maximal guessing probability. The constraints can be
simplified by some mathematical techniques. Considering the worst situation, equation (7) and (8) become
m0 + u
0
0 ≥ 1− e0 (14)
u00 ≤ e1 (15)
by (11)-(12), we get
m1 ∗
(~S2 − ~S3) · ~T1
2
= 1− e2 − e3 (16)
Since 0 < m1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ |~T1| ≤ 1, we get
|~S2 − ~S3| ≥ 2(1− e2 − e3) (17)
So the maximal guessing probability denotes the solution to the following optimization problem:
P¯ =
1
4
max
3∑
x=0
pg(x, 0) ≤
1
2
+
1
4
max {pg(2, 0) + pg(3, 0)}
where pg(x, y) = myq
λ1
x (
1
2
+
1
2
|~Sλ1x ·
~Ty|) +myq
λ2
x (
1
2
+
1
2
|~Sλ2x ·
~Ty|) + (1 −my)
subject to
m0 + u
0
0 ≥ 1− e0
u00 ≤ e1
|~S2 − ~S3| ≥ 2(1− e2 − e3)
p(0|2, 0) = m0(
1
2
+
1
2
|~S2 · ~T0|) + u
0
0
p(0|3, 0) = m0(
1
2
+
1
2
|~S3 · ~T0|) + u
0
0
0 < m0, u
0
0 ≤ 0
qλ1x + q
λ2
x = 1(x = 2, 3)
~Sx = q
λ1
x
~Sλ1x + q
λ2
x
~Sλ2x (x = 2, 3)
(18)
Thus for observed QBERs, p(0|2, 0) and p(0|3, 0), we can calculate the maximal guessing probability numerically.
6V. SIMULATION
In Fig 2, we plot the value of maximal guessing probability as a function of QBERs compared with BQB14 protocol.
FIG. 2. Simulation: Maximal guessing probabilities vs QBERs. We set the four QBERs e0 = e1 = e2 = e3 and p(0|2, 0) =
p(0|3, 0) = 1/2. The blue solid line is BQB14 protocol and the orange dashed line is our protocol.
In the simulation, we assume the four QBERs e0 = e1 = e2 = e3 and p(0|2, 0) = p(0|3, 0) = 1/2. From the
simulation results, we can see both BQB14 protocol and our protocol can work in high noisy environment even when
the QBERs are close to 0.5. And the maximal guessing probability in our protocol is lower than that in BQB14
protocol. In the ideal situation, the maximal guessing probabilities of our protocol is approximate to 0.75, and for
BQB14 protocol, it is 0.854.
Then we use off-the-shelf experimental parameters to show the performance of the protocol in the presence of loss
and noise, e.g., the loss is d dB, detection efficiency is ηd = 10% and its dark count rate is pd = 10
−5. Besides,
we consider a misalignment of detector de = 1%. Thus the overall QBER e =
0.5∗(1−10−
d
10 )∗pd+ηd∗de
10−
d
10 +(1−10−
d
10 )∗pd
. And still
p(0|2, 0) = p(0|3, 0) = 1/2 .The simulation is shown in Fig 3. Results show our protocol can generate quantum
randomness up to 25 dB.
FIG. 3. Simulation: Min-entropy vs channel loss(dB). We set ηd = 0.1, d = 10
−5 per pulse. The detector error rate is 1%. The
blue (lower) line is BQB14 protocol and the orange (upper) line is our protocol.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Inspired by the pioneering work on quantum randomness generation [21, 24, 25] , we propose an alternative method
which has higher quantumness generation rate at the same condition. Same as [21], our method works in a prepare-
and-measure scenario with independent devices. In our method, all observed probabilities are directly used to bound
the min-entropy of the output data, while a specific witness value is used in other protocols. Hence, our method
gives a tighter bound of min-entropy and thus, higher quantumness generation rate is obtained. Besides, our protocol
maintains the advantage of BQB14 protocol that works in high lossy environment.
We use phase-randomized weak coherent source in experiment. However, our theory is for the single photon source.
We provide two ways to overcome this problem. The first way is using a photon-number-resolving detector[26, 27].
Thus we can clearly distinguish single photon events from multiphoton events. Then we can discard all multi-photon
7events and just use the trials that correspond to single photon events to generate randomness. The second way is
using the decoy states method when photon-number-resolving detector is not available. Similarly with decoy state
quantum key distribution[28–30], we assume that Alices source is phase-randomized weak coherent source. Then
Alice can prepare additional decoy states besides the signal state by modulating the mean photon number of the laser
pulses. In experiment, we observe that qµ(b|x, y) directly, where µ is the mean photon number of the source. Note
that qµ(b|x, y) =
∑∞
n=0 pn(µ)qn(b|x, y), where pn(µ) is the probability of n-photon events of a phase randomized weak
coherent source, qn(b|x, y) is the probability of outputting b conditioned that the source emits a n-photon pulse, Alice
inputs x and Bob inputs y. If we know q1(b|x, y), we can calculate the min-entropy for single photon events with our
theory. Then the min-entropy for all the events can be obtained by multiplying p1(µ), since we can assume the min-
entropy for multi-photon events is 0. Fortunately, with the idea of decoy states we can establish some linear equations
qµ(b|x, y) =
∑∞
n=0 pn(µ)qn(b|x, y) by modulating different µ. Then the bounds of q1(b|x, y) can be obtained by solving
these linear equations. Furthermore, when the number of decoy states is infinite (modulating infinite different µ),
we can get the precise value of q1(b|x, y) in principle. Then the calculation of min-entropy is straightforward by our
theory. In conclusion, we can choose one from these two ways to exclude the effect of multiphoton events and generate
true quantum randomness using our protocol.
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